We investigate the impact of covenant violations on audit report timeliness. We argue that the existence of covenant violations might motivate clients or banks to seek waivers or renegotiations of current lending contracts. Otherwise, auditors might perform more audit tests before issuing audit opinions. Ultimately, auditors will increase the number of days to complete the audit. Our major findings are consistent with our prediction. In addition, we find that the presence of early covenant violations further increases audit delays. Our findings identify another factor affecting the audit report timeliness and one economic consequence of covenant violations.
Introduction
Audit report timeliness, also referred to as audit delay or audit report lag, denotes the number of calendar days between the fiscal year-end and the audit report date (Ashton et al., 1987 (Ashton et al., , 1989 . Audit delay can affect both timeliness of annual report filings and annual earnings announcements (Givoly and Palmon, 1982; Ashton et al., 1987; Bamber et al., 1993) . This issue is important because late earnings announcements usually lead to lower abnormal stock returns (Givoly and Palmon, 1982; Ashton et al., 1987) .
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) emphasise the timeliness/relevance of public information disclosure. For example, the FASB considers timeliness an important part of relevance, one of two primary qualitative qualities defined by the Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 8 1 (FASB, 2010) . The SEC has passed sequential regulatory requirements to accelerate the filing deadlines for many public companies (SEC release nos. 33-8128 and 33-8644) . However, timeliness could conflict with the recent PCAOB (Public Company Accounting Oversight Board) standards that focus on faithful representation of annual financial reporting. For example, PCAOB Auditing Standard No. 15 requires auditors to obtain 'sufficient and appropriate' audit evidence to provide a reasonable basis for the audit opinion (PCAOB Release No. 2010-004) . PCAOB Auditing Standard No. 14 asks auditors to consider "all relevant audit evidence, regardless of whether it appears to corroborate or to contradict the assertions in the financial statements" (PCAOB Release No. 2010-004) .
Based on the aforementioned FASB, SEC and PCAOB concerns, auditors face a trade-off between relevance and faithful representation of financial statement information. Foremost, auditors should care about relevance. Auditors are motivated to issue timely audit reports if clients consider late audit completions as a sign of incompetence of the current auditors and tend to switch auditors (Schwartz and Soo, 1996) . Alternatively, auditors are likely to emphasise faithful representation. Auditors tend to collect sufficient evidence to ensure financial statements show faithful information and thus increase the audit report lag. Anecdotal evidence suggests that auditors spend more time to complete an audit upon the implementation of PCAOB Auditing Standards No. 2 on internal control and No. 3 on documentation (Bronson et al., 2011) . This evidence indicates that auditors focus on faithful representation and collect more evidence.
Previous studies find many factors that increase audit delays. These factors include losses, extraordinary and discontinued items, restatements, leverage, modified audit opinions, audit fees, auditor changes, and internal control weakness (Whittred, 1980; Ashton et al., 1987 Ashton et al., , 1989 Kinney and McDaniel, 1993; Schwartz and Soo, 1996; Ettredge et al., 2006) . In this study, we examine the relationship between covenant violations and audit report lag. Specifically, we investigate whether the presence of covenant violations extends audit delays and which type of covenant violations is more likely to increase audit delays. To our knowledge, there is no previous study that investigates the impact of covenant violations on audit delays.
We expect that the presence of covenant violations is positively associated with the audit delay. Correspondingly, we hypothesise that auditors will take covenant violations into consideration before issuing audit reports because covenant violations increases litigation risk. On one hand, clients or creditors will take time and efforts to resolve covenant violations among three scenarios -violations are waived, lending agreements are renegotiated or actual defaults in interest and principal payments incur. Auditors will wait to find out the actual outcome. At which point, they will then read and evaluate relevant documents. On the other hand, auditors are motivated to perform more audit tests including substantive tests before issuing audit opinions. These additional audit tests will also lead to audit delays. In addition, we predict that the presence of early covenant violations results in even longer audit delays. The reasoning is that early violations may have more severe consequences, and thus auditors will be motivated to further extend audit report lags during these engagements.
To test the association between covenant violations and audit delays, we examine a sample of 10,536 firm-year observations from 3,326 companies from 2004 to 2007. We control for many factors relating to audit delays, including client-related characteristics, audit-outcome-related characteristics, industry effects and year effects. These factors are shown to be determinants of audit delays in prior studies (e.g., Ashton et al., 1987 Ashton et al., , 1989 Schwartz and Soo, 1996; Ettredge et al., 2006) . Additionally, we perform cluster standard error regression and propensity score-matching regression as robustness tests.
We find that the existence of covenant violations is positively associated with audit delays. On average, the presence of covenant violations extends audit report lag by about twelve days. Moreover, companies violating their covenants only once or twice experience longer audit delays than companies violating covenants more than twice. The robustness tests confirm the OLS regression results.
This study contributes to the literature on determinants of audit delays. We indicate one new determinant that extends audit delays -covenant violations. The findings should have implications for regulators and audit firms who are motivated to reduce the length of time necessary to complete an audit and increase the timeliness of financial reporting releases, especially under the pressure of recent accelerated filing requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SEC release nos. 33-8128 and 33-8644; Bronson et al. 2011) . When clients carry large amounts of debts or recurring covenant violations, to reduce audit report lags, auditors may contact clients and banks to know resolutions of covenants violations as early as possible and/or consider developing more efficient audit procedures (e.g., notes payables).
Our study also contributes to the literature on economic consequences of covenant violations. Previous studies mainly focus on economic consequences of covenant violations related to creditors (e.g., Roberts and Sufi, 2009a) and stockholders (e.g., Nini et al., 2012; Vashishtha, 2014) . There are fewer studies that examine the impact of covenant violations on auditor-related outcomes. Given that auditors are more likely to be sued by shareholders than by other parties for negligence (Lys and Watts, 1994) , our study indicates that covenant violations can have negative impacts on auditors due to longer audit report lags.
Finally, our study contributes to the body of research that examines timeliness and quality of accounting information. We show that at the instance of covenant violations, auditors' trade-off between relevance and faithful representation of financial statement information. A longer audit report lag can have a negative impact on the timeliness of earnings announcements and subsequent stock returns (Givoly and Palmon, 1982; Ashton et al., 1987) . In addition, longer audit delays can even decrease reliability of preliminary earnings information in advance of annual financial reporting (Bronson et al., 2011) .
The remaining part of the study is organised as follows: We review previous literature and develop our hypothesis in the next section. In the third section, we explain the model specification. The fourth section shows our sample selection and descriptive statistics.
The fifth section presents the empirical results. The final section contains our conclusions.
Literature review and hypothesis development

Audit report timeliness
Previous studies have identified various determinants of audit delays related to either audit outcomes or clients. Characteristics affecting audit outcomes refer to audit opinion (e.g., Ashton et al., 1987) , auditor size (Ashton et al., 1989) , audit structure (Bamber et al., 1993) , auditor change (e.g., Schwartz and Soo, 1996) , audit effort (Knechel and Payne, 2001 ), non-audit service (Knechel and Payne, 2001 ) and office-level characteristics (Whitworth and Lambert, 2014) . Characteristics relating to clients refer to general firm-wide characteristics and specific accounting characteristics. General characteristics include firm size (e.g., Ashton et al., 1987) , fiscal year-end (e.g., Ashton et al., 1987) , industry classification (e.g., Ashton et al., 1987) , internal control system (e.g., Ashton et al., 1987; Ettredge et al., 2006) and internal audit function (Abbot et al., 2012) . Accounting characteristics include net loss (e.g., Ashton et al., 1987) , extraordinary item (e.g., Ashton et al., 1989) , misstatement (e.g., Kinney and McDaniel, 1993) , leverage (e.g., Ettredge et al., 2006) , and earnings decreases (Whitworth and Lambert, 2014) .
Several studies consider leverage as one determinant (Ettredge et al., 2006; Abbot et al., 2012; Whitworth and Lambert, 2014) . Leverage is not necessarily associated with covenant violations. Only some covenants are violated due to leverage restrictions (Beneish and Press, 1993) . Our study extends literature about audit delays by directly examining the impact of technical defaults (i.e., covenant violations) 2 on audit delays.
Covenant violation
Covenant violation, also called technical default, is the violation of a debt covenant but not the default on interest or principal payments (Chava and Roberts, 2008) . Economic theory indicates that lenders consider covenants to be an effective mechanism to monitor borrowers (e.g., Aghion and Bolton, 1992; Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994) . Upon covenant violations, lenders can either waive the violations or renegotiate loan contracts by strengthening loan terms such as interest rate, maturity, collateral, and number of covenants (Beneish and Press, 1993; Chen and Wei, 1993; Nini et al., 2012) . Covenant violations happen frequently as Roberts and Sufi (2009a) find that more than one-fourth of their sample firms violate a financial covenant. Previous studies demonstrate various economic consequences of covenant violations in terms of net debt issuance (Roberts and Sufi, 2009a) , capital investment (Chava and Roberts, 2008) , shareholder payouts, CEO turnover, operating cash flow and stock price (Nini et al., 2012) , financial disclosure (Vashishtha, 2014) , bid-ask spreads, stock return volatility and audit fees (Gao et al., 2015) . Gao et al. (2015) examine the impact of covenant violations on audit fees while our study focuses on the relationship between covenant violations and audit delays. While audit fees can evaluate audit efforts/audit work (e.g., Lobo and Zhao, 2013) , audit work is a different measure from audit delays because more audit work does not necessarily result in longer audit delays (Ashton et al., 1989) 3 . Furthermore, audit fees are not a pure measure of audit efforts because audit fees are jointly determined by audit efforts, litigation risk, normal profits and even auditorclient relationship (Choi et al., 2010) . Otherwise, audit delays emphasise the need for the timeliness in financial reporting and thus the impact of released financial information on stock prices (Givoly and Palmon, 1982; Ashton et al., 1987) .
Test of hypothesis
Litigation claims are costly to auditors (Palmrose, 1988) . When litigation risk is high, auditors become more conservative. For example, auditors are more likely to issue modified audit opinions (Carcello and Palmrose, 1994; Krishnan and Krishnan, 1996) , or insist that clients make income-decreasing accounting choices (Lys and Watts, 1994; DeFond and Subramanyam, 1998) . Stice (1991) and Pratt and Stice (1994) indicate that the poorer the client's financial condition, the more likely that the auditor will face a lawsuit. Though covenant violations do not always come from financial distresses (Chava and Roberts, 2008) , financial deterioration is an important determinant of covenant violations (Beneish and Press, 1993) . Furthermore, economic costs of covenant violations are significant (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986) . For instance, the presence of covenant violations reduces subsequent net debt issuances (Roberts and Sufi, 2009a) , capital investments (Chava and Roberts, 2008) , and shareholder payouts, and increases future CEO turnovers (Nini et al., 2012) . Accordingly, auditors are inclined to pay much attention to covenant violations during auditing engagements.
We expect that the presence of covenant violations can extend the audit report lag through two possible ways. The first way is that either the client or the bank postpones the financial reporting date to resolve covenant violations. The second way is that the auditor performs additional tests and thus initiates the delay 4 . Initially, efforts from the client or the creditor might lead to the delay for the audit report issuance. Clients or banks are motivated to resolve covenant violations before financial statements are issued. Renegotiations are common practice after covenant violations occur (Beneish and Press, 1993; Roberts and Sufi, 2009b; Denis and Wang, 2013) . Though either the borrower or the lender can start the renegotiation process, the renegotiation is usually initiated by the borrower (Roberts and Sufi, 2009b) . Typically, it takes about two months to complete the renegotiation (Beneish and Press, 1993 5 ). Time and effort related to renegotiations vary with the loan size, the complexity of the renegotiation, and even the extent of borrowers and lenders' understanding of transactions and implications (Roberts and Sufi, 2009b) . During the renegotiation, lenders can either modify current covenants or add new covenants. Restrictions of current covenants can be relaxed, tightened or left unchanged (Beneish and Press, 1993) . Through renegotiations, lenders are able to exercise control rights to affect borrowers' financial and real decisions.
As the occurrence of covenant violations gives rise to the litigation risk, auditors would rather wait enough days to observe the resolution of covenant violations: whether the violation will be waived, the lending agreement will be renegotiated, or the debt service default (inability to pay principal or interest) will actually happen. In particular, if lenders choose to waive the violation or renegotiate the lending agreements, auditors will have to analyse the relevant documents and evaluate the future probability of breaching covenants and defaulting on debts.
On the other hand, auditors might be motivated to perform more audit tests, which result in longer audit report lags. Chen and Church (1992) show that auditors consider covenant violations in going-concern decision processes 6 . They indicate that lenders are likely to announce debt in default and require immediate repayments after covenants are violated. Auditors will be inclined to issue going-concern opinions if defaults have happened or renegotiations are in progress. Before issuing audit opinions, auditors might perform more audit tests including substantive tests. For example, auditors might obtain confirmations from creditors, recalculate accrued interests, check duplicate copies of note payables, or even review minutes of the board of directors meetings (Arens et al., 2013) .
To sum up, the existence of covenant violations might increase the litigation risk. Therefore, before issuing formal audit reports, auditors might become more conservative by taking more time to find out the outcome of covenant violations or even perform more audit tests. Hence, the existence of covenant violations is positively related to audit delays and we specify the first hypothesis as below:
H1 Other things being equal, the presence of covenant violations increases the audit report lag.
We further investigate the impact of covenant violation frequency on audit delays. Beneish and Press (1993) and Chen and Wei (1993) focus on first-time covenant violations. Early covenant violations bring larger shocks to auditors. Auditors might consider early violations to be more severe and more likely associated with potential litigation claims. Therefore, auditors might wait even longer or conduct more tests before issuing audit opinions. On the other hand, during audit engagements with repeat violations, auditors become more familiar with clients or banks and even rely on prior years' data to reduce the length of time to complete the audit. Ultimately, we predict that early covenant violations are associated with even longer audit delays and state the following second hypothesis:
H2 Other things being equal, the presence of early covenant violations further increases the audit report lag.
Research design
We establish the following two empirical models to investigate the impact of covenant violations on audit delays (hypotheses 1 and 2) 
where the dependent variable, AUDDELAY, denotes the number of calendar days between the fiscal year-end and the auditor's report date. In model 1 (in order to test Hypothesis 1), the independent variable, VIOLATION, represents a dummy variable equalling one if the client violates its debt covenant. Based on Hypothesis 1, we predict a positive sign for this variable. In model 2 (in order to test Hypothesis 2), the six independent variables, VIO_1, VIO_2, VIO_3, VIO_4, VIO_5, VIO_n, represent dummy variables equalling one if the client has violated its debt covenant once, twice, three times, four times, five times, and more than five times, respectively. The six variables thus indicate the frequency of covenant violations. According to Hypothesis 2, we expect that coefficients of dummy variables representing early covenant violations are more likely to be significant and positive with larger magnitudes (i.e., VIO_1
We rely on previous audit delay studies to include control variables in model 1 and 2. We control for twelve client-related variables. LEVERAGE, LOSS, DECREASE, RECEIVABLES, INVENTORY, EXTRADISCON, DISTRESS, and RESTATEMENT represent clients' accounting attributes while FIRMSIZE, GROWTH, YEAREND, and ICWEAK stand for clients' general features. We expect LEVERAGE, LOSS, DECREASE to have a positive association with audit delays because these variables indicate poor financial condition and auditors might face high audit risk (Abbott et al., 2012; Whitworth and Lambert, 2014) . We further include DISTRESS (Altman's z-score) to directly measure financial distress since Chen and Church (1992) suggest that auditors consider default in debts when issuing going-concern opinions. The inclusion of DISTRESS thus separates the impact of debt service defaults on audit delays from that of covenant violations. Since a higher value of DISTRESS indicates a higher probability of bankruptcy, we predict a positive sign. RECEIVABLES and INVENTORY are predicted to be positively related to audit delays because receivables and inventories are mostly prone to errors and lead to higher audit fees (Simunic, 1980) . EXTRADISCON is also expected to have a positive sign because extraordinary and discontinued items come from nonroutine operations of the company (Ashton et al., 1987) . As the existence of restatements should motivate auditors to increase audit procedures based on environments with greater risk of material misstatements, we predict a positive sign for RESTATEMENT (Ettredge et al., 2006) .
As to variables relating to clients' general characteristics, we expect both FIRMSIZE and YEAREND (equalling one for non-December fiscal year-ends) to have negative signs. Firm size is usually negatively associated with audit delays and companies with non-December year-ends are less likely to compete for auditors' time-constrained resources (Ashton et al., 1987 (Ashton et al., , 1989 . Furthermore, firm growth might create a larger degree of uncertainty and we predict a positive sign for GROWTH (Whitworth and Lambert, 2014) 8 . Finally, because the presence of internal control weakness motivates auditors to enlarge their scope of work and conduct more substantive tests, we expect ICWEAK to be positively associated with the audit delay (Ettredge et al., 2006) .
We control for three variables relating to audit outcomes. We predict that companies receiving modified audit opinions are more likely to experience longer delays probably because auditors would like to perform more audit tests before issuing modified opinions. (Ettredge et al., 2006; Whitworth and Lambert, 2014) . Thus, the coefficient on MODOPIN is predicted to be positive. Furthermore, because auditor changes encourage auditors to perform a more extensive and lengthy initial audit due to increased risk of litigation and some start-up costs necessary to get familiar with their clients (Schwartz and Soo, 1996; Ettredge et al., 2006) , we expect AUDCHG to be positively related to audit delays. Finally, we predict a positive sign for AUDFEE because audit fees are associated with the level of audit complexity, which might extend the length to complete the audit (Ettredge et al., 2006) .
We also use additional dummy variables to control for effects of different years and industries. The inclusion of industries' dummies are consistent with the notion from previous studies that audit delays are diverse among different industries (e.g., Ashton et al., 1987 Ashton et al., , 1989 Schwartz and Soo, 1996; Ettredge et al., 2006; Abbot et al., 2012; Whitworth and Lambert, 2014) 9 . Table 1 shows our sample selection procedure. We start with a sample of 89,317 firm-year observations in Audit Analytics database that has audit report date data. We then merge this sample with Compustat database and eliminate companies with incomplete data. We remove firm-year observations without information about audit fees, restatements, and internal controls in Audit Analytics. We finally merge this reduced sample with the database about covenant violations Missing audit fee data 6,179
Sample selection and descriptive statistics
Sample selection
Missing restatement data 7,207
Missing internal control data 34,576
Missing covenant data 11,210
Final sample 10,536 Table 3 (70) days respectively. The difference between means (medians) is significant at the 1% level. The mean (median) differences in firm characteristics show that observations with covenant violations are smaller in firm size, more leveraged, more likely to have losses and decreases in earnings, much more financially distressed and faster in growth. They also have more inventories, receivables, extraordinary and discontinued items, restatements and internal control weaknesses. The mean (median) differences in audit-related characteristics show that observations with covenant violations are more likely to receive modified audit opinions, switch auditors and tolerate higher audit fees. The statistics of Panel C are similar to those of Panel B. Compared with the full control sample the control sample from the matching approach has longer audit delays, less receivables and inventories, and more financial distresses. The control sample from the matching approach also receives fewer modified audit opinions and has fewer auditor switches. Audit delay also has a significant and negative correlation with firm size and Altman's z-score. This finding supports our first hypothesis and is consistent with previous studies about determinants of audit delays. Furthermore, the variable of interest, the existence of covenant violations, has significant and positive correlations with leverage, losses, decreases in earnings, receivables, inventories, extraordinary and discontinued items, firm growth, restatements, internal control weaknesses, modified audit opinions, auditor changes, and audit fees. The existence of covenant violations also has significant and negative correlations with firm size and Altman's z-score. Notes: This table presents the OLS regression results on the effect of covenant violations on audit delay. The dependent variable is audit delay, which is number of calendar days between the fiscal year-end and the auditor's report date. Significance based on a two-tailed test at 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and *** respectively. Variables are defined in Appendix.
Descriptive statistics
Empirical results
Main regressions
The results from the columns for Model 2 indicate that the coefficients on VIO_1 and VIO_2 are positive at the 1% significance level. The coefficients on VIO_3 and VIO_4 are positive at the 10% significance level. The magnitude of the coefficient on VIO_1 (10.9) is larger than that of the coefficients on VIO_3 (5.3) and VIO_4 (8.5). The magnitude of the coefficient on VIO_2 (16.8) is much larger than that of the coefficients on VIO_3 (5.3) and VIO_4 (8.5). However, the magnitude of the coefficient on VIO_1 is smaller than that on VIO_2, probably because auditors experience surprises when clients face covenant violations in the second year. Accordingly, we find some evidence that auditors tend to increase the length of time to complete the audit during engagements with early covenant violations. According to variance inflation factor (VIF), multicollinearity problems are not serious in our regressions. The largest VIF factors for the two models are 1.969 and 1.970 respectively. The VIF factors are less than the cut-off value of 10.
Robustness tests
Because OLS regression results can be biased due to the fact the residuals may be correlated across firms and across time periods in a panel dataset (Petersen, 2009) , we run the cluster standard error regressions. This technology can avoid serial correlation problems in cross-sectional regressions because standard errors are clustered by firm and year. Table 6 presents the cluster standard error regression results for Model 1 and 2. For Model 1, the coefficient on VIOLATION is 11.890, at the 1% significance level. The coefficient of 11.890 in the cluster standard error regression is similar to the coefficient of 11.458 in the OLS regression. For Model 2, the coefficients on VIO_1 and VIO_2 are 11.406 and 17.167 respectively, at the 1% significance level. These coefficients are also comparable to the coefficients in the OLS regressions. The coefficients on VIO_3, VIO_4, VIO_5 and VIO_n are not significant. The results suggest that the longer audit delay mainly come from early covenant violations. Overall, the results from the cluster standard error regressions are qualitatively similar to the results from OLS regressions.
As 8.9% of our sample observations (936 firm-year observations) have covenant violations, there may be some unobservable factors that can confound our results. Therefore, in order to fairly estimate the effect of covenant violations, we construct a control group by using the propensity score matching approach. We first run a logistic regression of the VIOLATION dummy variable on all the control variables (i.e., FIRMSIZE, LEVERAGE, LOSS, DECREASE, RECEIVABLES, INVENTORY, EXTRADISCON, DISTRESS, GROWTH, RESTATEMENT, YEAREND, ICWEAK, MODOPIN, AUDCHG , AUDFEE, year dummies and industry dummies). Then we conduct a match of one-to-one nearest neighbour with replacement to come up with a control group that is not associated with covenant violations. Thus each firm-year observation with covenant violations is paired with an observation without covenant violations. By using this technique, we can address the selection on observations and remove the impact of unobservable factors. We have a pooled sample of 1,872 firm-year observations and we rerun the OLS regressions for Model 1 and 2. Table 7 presents results of the OLS regressions by using the reduced sample based on the propensity-score matching approach. The results from Model 1 show that the coefficient on VIOLATION is positive at the 1% significance level. The results from Model 2 indicate that the coefficients on VIO_1 and VIO_2 are positive at the 1% significance level. The coefficients on VIO_3, VIO_4 and VIO_5 are positive at the 10% significance level. The coefficients on VIO_1 and VIO_2 are much larger than those on VIO_3, VIO_4 and VIO_5. Accordingly, the results are quite close to the results in Table 5 . Table 6 Cluster standard error regression results (dependent variable = audit delay) Notes: This table presents the OLS regression results based on a control sample matched by the propensity score (the matching begins with a logistic regression of the covenant violations on all control variables. Then we use the propensity scores obtained from the logistic estimation and perform a one to one nearest neighbour match with replacement). The dependent variable is audit delay, which is number of calendar days between the fiscal year-end and the auditor's report date. Significance based on a two-tailed test at 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and *** respectively. Variables are defined in Appendix.
Conclusions
This study investigates the association between the existence of covenant violations and the audit reporting timeliness. The timeliness of financial statement filings is an important issue considered by investors, regulators, managers, auditors and possibly other stakeholders. The FASB specifies relevance (closely related to timeliness) as one of two primary decision-specific qualities for financial reporting. The SEC rules further emphasise timely filings by setting up accelerated deadlines for public companies. On the other hand, recent PCAOB standards concentrates on faithful representation of financial information by asking auditors to collect sufficient and appropriate audit evidence and considering all relevant audit evidence. Despite the pressure on timeliness of annual reporting filings, previous studies find that many factors can motivate auditors to postpone the deadline to complete the audit and thus delay the filing date of annual reports. Our analysis extends these studies by examining whether the presence of covenant violations further extends the length of time to complete the audit. We predict that once covenant violations incur, clients or banks resolve covenant violations by seeking waivers or renegotiations of current lending agreements. Auditors then trade-off between relevance and faithful representation and wait enough time to observe the resolution of covenant violations. Otherwise, auditors are motivated to collect more audit evidence and postpone the issuance date of audit opinions. The presence of covenant violations is associated with a longer audit delay.
Our OLS regression results are consistent with our hypotheses. On average, it takes about twelve more days for auditors to complete the audit if covenant violations happen. Furthermore, companies violating their debt covenants once or twice are associated with even longer audit delays. The OLS results are confirmed with sensitivity tests of the cluster standard error regressions and the propensity-score matching approach.
Our study indicates a new determinant of audit delays. We show that besides common factors such as losses, modified audit opinions, restatements, internal control weakness that can extend audit delays, the presence of covenant violations is also negatively related to audit delays. Therefore, regulators might want to take this factor into consideration to emphasise the timeliness of financial reporting. To reduce the length of time to complete the audit, auditors might get more familiar with clients and creditors to understand resolutions of covenant violations and/or develop more efficient procedures relating to notes payables. Our study also provides some evidence to show the trade-off between relevance and faithful representation of public information disclosure. Finally our study illustrates one economic consequence of covenant violations.
2
In finance, default can be classified as two types: debt services default and technical default. Debt service default happens when the borrower is not able to pay interest or principal.
Technical default incurs when a covenant is violated. 3 Ashton et al. (1989) stated that "... however, an increase in audit work might not lead to longer audit delay, because the auditor has flexibility in timing the audit work. More work could be done prior to the financial statement date, or it could be done after year-end by assigning more staff or working more overtime". 4
These are possible theories we predict. We cannot endorse one over the other because we cannot examine these explanatory theories in our empirical analyses. 5
In footnote 11, Beneish and Press (1993) indicate the mean time for the renegotiation process is two months. 6 Among the Chen and Church (1992)'s sample of 127 companies receiving going-concern opinions, 34 companies had covenant violations. 8 out of these 34 companies had received a waiver from the lenders. 7
Definition of each variable is shown in Appendix. 8 GROWTH represents the ratio of book to market value of assets and is calculated as total assets divided by market value of equity plus book value of total debts. The higher the value of GROWTH, the company has more firm growth. Previous literature uses three common proxies for firm growth: the ratio of market to book value of assets, the ratio of market to book value of equity, and the price to earnings ratio (Adam and Goyal, 2008) . Adam and Goyal (2008) indicates that the ratio of market to book value of assets is the most appropriate variable for the firm growth because it has the highest information content of all proxies. Our proxy for firm growth is the inverse of the first proxy. Based on Whitworth and Lambert (2014), we especially use the inverse of the market-to-book ratio of assets to create a positive relationship between audit delays and the firm growth proxy. 9
Ettredge et al. (2006) and Abbot et al. (2012) only use two dummy variables to separate financial industry and high-tech industry from other industries. To further identify the impact of all possible industries on the audit delay, we adopt the approach of Whitworth and Lambert (2014) to include more industry dummies. In particular, we set up industry dummies based on the one-digit SIC code of sample companies and thus include nine industry dummy variables. 10 We obtain covenant violation data from the database created by Nini et al. (2012) . This database provides covenant violation information for a large sample of non-financial firms in the Compustat database for the period 1996 to 2007. This database has three variables to represent the company, the fiscal year and the covenant violation respectively. The variable of interest is the third variable, an indicator variable for whether or not the company reports a violation in its debt covenant during the corresponding fiscal year. Nini et al. (2012) hand-collected covenant violation data from 10-Q or 10-K SEC filings. Based on improved text-search algorithm, they found 40% more incidents of violations. 11 If Altman's score is less than 1.88, companies are in the 'distress' zone of a large probability of going bankrupt. If Altman's score is more than 2.99, companies are in the 'safe' zone. 
